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LORD RUSSELL.

The meeting of the American Bar Association

at Saratoga, August i 9 th to 22d, derives unusual interest this year

from the visit of Lord Russell, of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of
England. His short service on the bench and the character of the
causes before him have hardly afforded an opportunity for testing
fairly his judicial abilities, but he is undoubtedly the possessor of a
powerful legal mind. Before his elevation to the bench he was for
years the acknowledged leader of the English bar. He is famous
for his eloquence, his knowledge of common law jurisprudence, and
his sympathetic interest in all matters of national concern. He will
be given a most cordial welcome, not only for his many eminent

qualities, but also because of his position as the head of the great
system of justice which is the foundation of American jurisprudence.

In re Assigned Estate of
SUB-PARTNER-SHARING PROFITS.
Haines & Conipany, Groves' Appeal, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, decided July 17, 1896 ; not yet reported. The facts in this
case were briefly as follows: The firm of Wood, Brown & Company
was a general partnership of seven members, two of whom-viz.,
Richard Wood and Samuel Brown-entered into another partnership

agreement with three other persons under the firm name of Granville
B. Haines & Company. In March, 1894, both firms made assign-

NOTES.

ments for the benefit of creditors. It was then discovered that
Wood and Brown, without the knowledge and consent of their
partners in either firm, had appropriated to the use of Haines &
Company $175,ooo belonging to Wood, Brown & Company. For
this $175,000 the assignee of Wood, Brown & Company made the

present claim against the estate of Haines & Company. It appeared,
moreover, that at the time Richard Wood and Samuel Brown entered
into the firm of Granville B. Haines & Company, they made an
agreement with the remaining five partners of the firm of Wood,
Brown & Company in which those five members agreed to indemnify
Wood and Brown from any losses which might result to them from
the business of the firm of Granville B. Haines & Company to the
extent of a sum equal to 28.2 per cent. of the losses, and Wood
and Brown agreed at the dissolution of the partnership of Granville
B. Haines & Company to pay over to their five partners in the firm
of Wood, Brown & Company a sum equal to 28.2 per cent. of the
profits by them realized from the business of the co-partnership into
which they were then entering.
The auditor to whom the account was referred found that all the
partners of Wood, Brown & Company were liable as partners of
Haines & Company, and that the estate of the one firm could not,
therefore, maintain this claim against the other. This ruling \was
sustained by the court below, who took the view that by the
agreement between Wood and Brown and the other five members
of the firm of Wood, Brown & Company, all of the members of
that firm became interested as partners in the profits and losses of
the firm of Haines & Company.
There thus arose before the Supreme Court two interesting questions on the law of partnership.
First. Is an agreement to share a sum equivalent to a percentage
of the profits and losses distinguishable from an agreement to share
the profits and losses themselves directly?
Second. Admitting that there does exist such a distinction, were
the five sub-partners to be regarded as third persons as respects the
firm of Haines & Company, since through Wood and Brown they
were interested in its operations?
The first question was disposed of by the court upon the authority
of Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa. 374, in which it was said that the
distinction between sharing the profits and sharing a sum equivalent
to a percentage of the profits, while of a very refined and shadowy
character, has been authoritatively established.
The second question gives rise to a consideration of the status of
At common law, possibly from an
a so-called "sub-partner."
elaborate extension of the property idea, it seems to have been
established that a sub-partner was liable to the firm creditors: See
Parsons (James) on Partnership, § 68. Yet such a construction
would create a staus one-sided indeed. It has been frequently held
that a sub-partner has no voice in the management of the firm, no
community in its profits, no lien before division to compel an
accounting and distribution, but that his claim is merely a demand
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against the partner with whom he contracted: See Collyer on
Partnership, § 194; Lindley on Partnership, * p. 48. To hold
one occupying such position liable to the firm creditors would seem
singularly unjust. Yet, strangely enough, the courts have not been
entirely unanimous in the few instances in which this question has
been before them. In New York, Indiana and Wisconsin the subpartner has been held exempt from the claims of the firms creditors:
Burnet v. Snyder, 76 N. Y. 344 ; Rockafellow v. Miller, 107 N. Y.
507 ; Reynolds v. Hicks, 19 Ind. ii3 ; Riedeburger v. Schnitt,
71 Wis. 644. Opposed to these authorities stands the case of Harri"Von v. Fitch, 13 Gray, 468, in which apparently a different
view is maintained, and to this effect the case is usually cited,
although it is to be noted that in that case the court stated the rule
to be that "an agreement between one co-partner and a third person
that he shall participate in the profits of a firm, asjprofits, renders him
liable as a partner to the creditors of the firm, although as between
himself and the members of the firm he is not their co-partner."
In the case in point, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, allying
itself with, it is submitted, the soundest view, maintained that since
the sub-partners did not share the profits, as profits, they were, as
respects the firm of Haines & Company, third persons, and not only
were they not liable to its creditors, but the assignee of Wood,
Brown & Company might properly claim the $175,000 involved.
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING THE ERECTION OF TROLLEY

Once more the courts have said in an
action brought by an abutting owner to have an ordinance authorizing the construction of a trolley system upon poles erected along
the highway, declared unlawful and void for failure to provide
compensation for the taking of private property, that such user of
the highway is legitimate and proper, and imposes no new servitude
upon the land: Roebling v. Trenton Pass.R. R. CO., 34 Atl. Rep.
1O93 (1896).
Whether the fee to the highway be in the abutting owner or in
the State, the answer is the same; for the whole beneficial use is in
the public for the purposes of a street: Hoboken h1n.
Co. v.
Hobokeni, 36 N. J. L. 540.
It is settled that the legislature is custodian of the rights of the
public in their highways, limited only by constitutional restriction.
The regulation of a street is given to a municipal corporation only
for corporate purposes, and subject to the paramount authority of
the state in respect to its general and more extended uses: Crse of
the P. &- T. R. -R., 6 Whart. 45 (1840). The power of a municipality over its streets is what the legislature has delegated to it:
2 Dill. Mun. Corp., § 680, 719.
Now it follows that when the legislature properly authorizes the
construction of a railroad upon its streets, or diverts them to any
other new use, it may legalize that which is a public nuisance; the
only question is, have the private rights of the abutters been invaded?
If they have, compensation must be made.
POLES ALONG HIGHWAYS.
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It was held in the Elevated Railroad Cases in New York, 90
N. Y. 122, that the abutting owner has only an easement of light,
air, and access, and the same conclusion was reached in Pennsylvania: P. R. R. Co. v. Duncan, iii Pa. 361 (1886); that the
erection in the cartway of a public street, of a track, supported by
pillars depriving the abutter of these property rights is a taking of
private property for which compensation must be made.
Without here considering whether the difference between using
horse cars and steam cars upon a highway is not merely a question
of degree, it is settled that horse railroads are consistent with the
purposes of a street: Hinchman v. Paterson R. R. Co., 17 N. J.
Eq. 75; and that steam railroads are not: see authorities in Lewis'
Em. Dom., § 115. As science advanced the legislature permitted
the substitution of electric cars for horse cars and with them came
new problems for the courts. Where the overhead electric system
is used, the company's right to erect poles is most frequently disputed. In Roebling v. Trenton Pass. R. R. Co. [supra], the
abutting owner contended "that the setting of these poles [under
the ordinance duly authorized by the legislature] on her lands
[along the curb] constituted a permanent, exclusive and continuous
use of her lands, not within the customary and legitimate use of the
lands of the abutting owners on a public way, and was to that
extent a taking of private property, such as is interdicted by the
Constitution, except upon just compensation made; " and alleged
that the ordinance was void because it contained no provision
authorizing such compensation.
After reiterating the principle that public convenience is no justification for the seizure of private property without due compensation
to the owner, the court, Depue, J., classed the case where it properly belongs. The Act of Assembly authorizing the substitution
was constitutioval and the ordinance of the city of Trenton was in
accordance with the Act. The court held that the erection of these
poles did not constitute an additional servitude, and that therefore
the ordinance was not void. As to what constitutes an additional
servitude the courts are not in harmony. In Detroit City R. R. Co.
v. Mills, 84 Mich. 634 (189i), Grant, J., said, "To constitute an
additional servitude they [the poles] must be an injury to the
present use and enjoyment of his land; " while Campbell, C. J.,
said that whether or not it was an additional servitude depended
upon the circumstances of each case; that if it constituted a
nuisance or caused damage the abutter had his remedy. Without
referring to this case the New Jersey court seems to agree with Mr.
Chief Justice Campbell, for Depue, J., says, that "Injuries caused
by a mode of user which is not justifiable, on the ground that the
locus in quo is a public street, will lay the foundation for, and are
redressible by action."
This seems the proper solution of the difficulty where the injury
can be compensated in damages, and the application of this rule
will amply protect the rights of the abutting owner.

